fragmented corpses of human beings at the end of time and grant to them eternal life and incorruptibility. In this article I wish to take seriously, rather than explain away, the medieval discussion of bodily resurrection. In doing so, I shall reinterpret a moment in the history of medieval philosophy and locate that moment in its context in religious practice. I shall also suggest that not only the basic concerns of the medieval discussion but even the materialistic details are relevant to modern problems in ways present-day preachers, believers, and skeptics have not understood.
THE MEDIEVAL DISCUSSION OF BODILY RESURRECTION
Through the doctrinal controversies of the second to fifth centuries C.E., the resurrection of the body was firmly established as an element of the Christian faith.1 Medieval councils confirmed this. The Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 required Cathars and other heretics to assent to the proposition that "all rise again with their own individual bodies, that is, the bodies which they now wear," and the Second Council of Lyon in 1274 reaffirmed the requirement.2 Conservative theologians charged with curtailing the more dangerous speculations of the university teachers of their day included among the propositions they condemned in 1277 the idea "that the corrupted body does not return one and the same, that is, does not rise numerically the same."3 If one argues, as scholars have recently done, that patristic and medieval polemics against heresy were less a quarrel with a clearly existent "other" than a process by which Christians defined themselves through creation of the "other," then one must say that theologians accorded importance, in eschatology, to the doctrine of up again and again in quodlibetal disputes (i.e., disputes by university students and masters on topics of current interest),8 and it provided the occasion for debating certain key philosophical issues raised by Aristotle, the most important being-as we shall see-the question of the unicity or plurality of forms.
What modern readers find most disturbing about medieval discussions is their extreme literalism and materialism. In order to illustrate these characteristics, I shall give a brief summary of the last section of Peter Lombard's Sentences, which determined the course of debate for hundreds of years. Although an overall principle of organization is difficult to discern in Peter's treatment, his emphasis is clear. He chose to consider final things in a way which gives pride of place to questions of the material reassemblage or reconstitution of the body.9
Beginning with the admonition (borrowed from Augustine) that not all questions can be answered, Peter devoted distinction (i.e., section) 43 of his fourth book to a discussion of the sound of the last trumpet, concentrating on the question whether those alive at that moment must die before being raised. In distinction 44, he turned to such questions as the following: What age, height, and sex will we have in the resurrected body? Will all matter which has passed through the body at any point be resurrected? Must bits of matter return to the particular members (e.g., fingernails or hair) where they once resided? Will the bodies of the damned as well as the saved rise with their defects repaired? Are aborted fetuses resurrected? How can the bodies of the damned burn without being consumed? Will demons (although incorporeal) suffer from corporeal fire in hell? Distinction 45, after considering where souls reside between death and resurrection and asserting (without explaining) that the blessed will experience an increase of joy in bodily resurrection, turns to lengthy consideration of the usefulness of prayers for the dead. Distinctions 46 and 47 explore in detail God's justice, especially the punishment of the damned. Distinctions 48 and 49 discuss specific questions concerning what we might call the topography and demography of blessedness: Where exactly will Christ descend as judge? Of what quality will light be after the Last Judgment? Will all the elect shine with the same glory, see with the same clarity, and rejoice with the same joy? Distinction 50 returns to details of the condition of the damned and, after considering the question of how the finger of Lazarus (Luke 16:22-26) could touch the tongue of the rich man when both (having died) were without body, repeats Augustine's warning that certain answers cannot be discovered.
As even such brief summary makes clear, the Last Judgment is primarily, to the Lombard, a matter of punishment and reward of exactly the same material stuff that constituted the body during life. The discussion, although almost pictorial in its vividness, is highly unoriginal, mostly borrowed in fact from Augustine's City of God and Enchiridion, with bits from Gregory, Julian of Toledo, Jerome, Hugh of St. Victor, Honorius Augustodunensis, and the school of Anselm of Laon thrown in. Nonetheless Peter Lombard appears to have chosen from among the available authorities in such a way as to underline the corporeal experience of the resurrected body.
The Lombard was not alone among twelfth-century theologians in emphasizing the materialism of the risen body. Hugh of St. Victor wondered whether we shall be able to open and close our eyes after the resurrection.'1 Honorius (and Herrad of Landsberg who borrowed his discussion) queried what color we will be in heaven and whether we will wear clothes.1 Guibert of Nogent fulminated against the cults of the tooth of Christ and of the holy foreskin because they implied that Christ had not risen in total bodily perfection and that our resurrection might therefore be defective as well.12 Several theologians debated whether food taken in by the body during its lifetime would become part of that body and rise at the end.'3 Such discussion continued throughout the thirteenth century. Schoolmen queried whether the gift of subtilitas received by the glorified body meant that that body could be in the same place at the same time as another body. The conclusion that it could be was, of course, suggested by gospel stories of Christ passing through closed doors after his resurrection.14 Theologians also asked whether we will smell sweet odors or touch other bodies in heaven. Will we eat or taste? The latter question was an extraordinarily difficult one; the indignities of digestion could hardly be ascribed to a glorified body endowed with impassibilitas, yet the resurrected Christ had, according to Luke 24:42-43, eaten boiled fish and honeycomb with his disciples.'5
The question of cannibalism and the resurrection, debated at least since the second century and engaged in new ways in the thirteenth, has seemed to modern commentators the most extravagant and offensive of such materialistic considerations. If human remains were eaten by other human beings, in which person would the common matter rise? By the time of Thomas Aquinas the discussion had become remarkably elaborate. A consensus had developed that digested food does become "of the substance of human nature" and rise at the end of time. Thus, eaten human remains will be resurrected in the person to whom they first belonged; the missing matter will be made up in the second person from the nonhuman stuff he or she has eaten. But what (hypothesized Aquinas) about the case of a man who ate only human embryos who generated a child who ate only human embryos? If eaten matter rises in the one who possessed it first, this child will not rise at all. All its matter will rise elsewhere: either in the embryos its father ate (from which its core of human nature, passed on in the semen, was formed) or in the embryos it ate. Although the cannibalism question had been considered seriously at least since Tertullian (d. ca. 220), the issue did not remain the same. To the early fathers such questions were challenges raised by the enemies of Christianity, against whom one asserted, in answer, the absolute power of God to supplement missing matter in any way he chose. Aquinas At first glance, this approach seems promising. The distasteful details of medieval discussion can indeed be stripped away to reveal perennial questions. The doctrine of bodily resurrection does involve fundamental issues of survival and identity still moot in philosophical circles. Nonetheless, further consideration of this tactic suggests that it is misguided. We will not understand either medieval positions or their relevance for modern theological discussion if we strip away the materialist detail. The details of the medieval discussion are exactly the point. I can explain this more clearly if I turn for a moment to modern philosophical discussion.
When we consider current discussions of personal identity and survival, we find that they too involve lengthy consideration of cases even their investigators admit to be bizarre. The two most common examples used in philosophical discussions over the past two or three decades are "teletransportation" (the mode of travel used in the TV series "Star Trek," whereby a person's body pattern is beamed through space in order to rematerialize on another planet) and the operation that we may alternatively call a "brain-" or a "body-transplant."21 (How we label it, of course, turns out to make a good deal of difference to what we think happens.) One of the most gripping and accessible recent explorations of questions of survival is John Perry's A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, which purports to be a deathbed conversation with a philosophy teacher from a small midwestern college who has refused a body transplant operation after a motorcycle accident because she claims "she" will not survive if her brain occupies a new body. Brain transplants, interstellar beaming of a body pattern, pods generated by invaders from outer space-speculation about such cases is perhaps no less odd than speculation about the resurrection of Christ's foreskin, about the "teletransportation" of glorified bodies, or about the fate of eaten embryos. And the oddness has been noticed. The philosopher J. L. Austin has described discourse in his own discipline as the "constant and obsessive repetition of the same small range of jejune examples."24 Nancy Struever has said of Bernard Williams's Problems of the Self (one of the very best of recent books on the survival question): "[It is] in many ways a wise book, but it is stuffed, literally stuffed, with bizarre examples: there are split personalities, amoebalike fissions of the body, nuclear fusions of minds, brain transfusions-a monstrous zoo seems to be the proper arena of discovery."25 Yet odd though these examples are, they cannot simply be discarded while we seek the perennial questions that lie behind them. This is so for three reasons. First, the examples used in philosophical investigation are sometimes the most time-bound elements of the debate.26 They may also be the place where popular assumptions and academic discourse touch each other most closely and most specifically. Thus, the historian of contemporary issues may find, in the particular illustrations chosen, the most telling information about historical context. Second, the bizarre examples are part of the discussion; often they bear the weight of the argument. For example, it is only by careful consideration of the case of "teletransportation" that we learn whether the philosopher using the example thinks personal identity depends on transported molecules or only on a transferred pattern or form. Third, it is in the examples that we see that current philosophical discussion clings, almost in spite of itself, to the issue of material continuity. It is therefore in the examples more clearly than in the articulated positions that we see the essential similarity of medieval and modern discussion.
Medieval and modern theories of survival are not the same, to be sure. All medieval thinkers held a soul-body dualism; few modern thinkers do. But recent philosophical discussion, unlike that of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries but like that of the Middle Ages, seems to find it almost impossible to envision personal survival without material continuity. It is the examples chosen by philosophers that make this clear.
By and large, in modern discussions, "soul" has been discarded. What is characteristic of both sides in the current discussion is their fascination with the body and with transfer of body parts. Today's philosophers wonder, for example, why we tend to assume that "we" survive if our body is replaced little by little in organ transplants but not if our entire body is replaced at once. They hypothesize experiments in which we are told that the body we occupy will wake tomorrow devoid of memory and then be subjected to intense pain; they ask whether, under these circumstances, we are afraid for ourselves and conclude that, since we do feel fear, we must assume in some sense that the body is our "self." Drawing on science fiction, they imagine cases in which a body pattern is beamed to another galaxy and rematerialized but the original body is left behind; which of the resultant entities (they ask) is the self? In contrast, the sort of evidence that fascinated people at the turn of the century and that could be adduced today (evidence from parapsychological research, for example, or from the near-death experiences documented by E. Kiibler-Ross) seldom finds its way into philosophical debate. Whatever money there is to be made in "new age" products or scientology, indications that disembodied spirits survive death arouse little philosophical interest. Even elaborators of the memory theory either content themselves with answering the difficulties in Locke's formulation pointed out by Joseph Butler in the eighteenth century,31 or in fact expend much energy discussing brain transplants and DNA extractions-that is, material continuity-as a way of explaining or questioning continuity of consciousness. Some recent theorists (e.g., Derek Parfit and Robert Nozick) hold that there are a number of hypothetical cases in which I cannot decide whether "I" survive or not. But this latter group of thinkers tends also to devote extensive attention to cases having to do with bodily continuity.32
Thus the most commonly examined and apparently pertinent examples in current philosophical discussion of identity and survival have to do with the place of body. And are these examples really so outre or jejune? I think we can say so only in a rather special sense of the word outre, for these cases are familiar. What is significant about the attitudes revealed in today's newspaper stories and movies is the underlying assumption that in some way the body is the self. Renee Fox and Judith Swazey's research on the sociological and psychological context of transplants has turned up repeated cases of persons who are convinced that identity is in some way transferred with organs.36 They report the following remark, made by the father of a boy heart donor to the father of the young girl who received the organ: "We've always wanted a little girl, so now we're going to have her and share her with you."37 Crammond's study of kidney recipients reports a donor's reaction to the recipient's decision to return to work: "He's being unfair to himself and to me. My thesis about the twelfth-and thirteenth-century theology of the body is twofold and, in both its parts, revisionist. First, much of the debate about the resurrection of the body and about the relation of body and soul revolved not around a soul/body contrast (although the soul and body were, of course, seen as distinct entities in a way they are not by most modern philosophers) but around the issue of bodily continuity. Questions of risen embryos, foreskins, and fingernails, of the subtlety of glorified flesh, of how and whether God makes whole the amputee or the fat man, are questions about the reassemblage of physical parts. Scholastic theologians worried not about whether body was crucial to human nature but about how part related to whole-that is, how bits could and would be reintegrated after scattering and decay. The crucial question to which discussion of the resurrected body returned again and again was not "Is body necessary to personhood?" Medieval theologians were so certain it was they sometimes argued that resurrection was "natural." Peter of Capua suggested, for example, that it was a consequence not of divine grace but of the structure of human nature that body returned to soul after the Last Judgment.42 The crucial theological question was rather, What accounts for the identity of earthly and risen body? What of "me" must rise in order for the risen body to be "me"? Only by considering the specific examples debated by schoolmen can we see the extent to which, between 1100 and 1320, they were really debating how far material continuity is necessary for identity.
Second, I wish to argue that this issue of bodily continuity (of how identity lasts through corruption and reassemblage) was manifested as an issue not merely in the bizarre limiting cases considered by scholastic theologians but also in pious practice: in the cult of saints and relics, in changes in legal, medical, and burial procedures in exactly this period, in the kinds of miracle stories that were popular with preachers and audiences. Thus I see a connection between actual church practice and the debates of ivory-tower intellectuals, and this connection is easiest to find not in the general philosophical issues such scholars considered but in the strangest of their specific examples.
The story of philosophical discourse in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is not, of course, usually told as a story in which issues of material continuity, or of part and whole, figure very prominently. It thus seems to me that a distrust of the strict hylomorphic theory of man and of the doctrine of the unicity of form was endemic in thirteenth-century debate because of a strong pull toward body as substantial-a pull reflected in the theory of resurrection that stressed numerical identity as material continuity. In other words, it was the more conservative, more Augustinian-Platonic thinkers (not the followers of Thomas) who made body "real" in a commonsense way; and their ideas fit the needs of the pious to experience body as a separate entity that was the locus both of temptation and of encounter with the divine. But even those who departed from theories of material continuity were uncomfortable with, and inconsistent in, their departure. The philosophically elegant new identity theory implied by Thomas and Giles of Rome and finally articulated by Peter of Auvergne, John of Paris, and Durandus of St. Pourgain-a theory that obviated any need to consider material continuity-never caught 53 Bonaventure, De assumptione B. Virginis Mariae, sermon 1, sec. 2, in S. Bonaventurae opera omnia, ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae (Quarrachi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1901), 9:690. See also Aquinas, ScG,, bk. 4, c. 79, in 15:249, and Aquinas, De potentia, q. 5, art. 10, pp. 176-77, which says explicitly that Porphyry's idea that the soul is happiest without the body, and Plato's idea that the body is a tool of the soul, are wrong; the soul is more like God when it is united to the body than when it is separated, because it is then more perfect. 54 H. J. Weber (n. 14 above), p. 326. The doctrine of the plurality of forms seems to lurk behind much Franciscan teaching on the dotes of the glorified body, for thinkers such as Bonaventure and Richard of Middleton hold that body is in some way predisposed for the flowing over of glory into it before it receives the dotes; see ibid., pp. 314 ff. 55 H. J. Weber, p. 304, n. 197; and see ibid., pp. 266, 135-36. The Augustinian idea that the soul desires the body so greatly that it is held back from vision of God when it is without the body is also found in Giles of Rome; see Nolan (n. 7 above), pp. 46, 78. on.56 Not only were certain of its consequences explicitly condemned; it was not fully used by its creators, who continued to speak of the resurrected body as reassembled by God from its own tiny bits of dust scattered throughout the universe.
This last point needs explanation in a little more detail. In the course of patristic discussion, theologians had come to see identity as the heart of resurrection.57 As John of Damascus said (and scholastic theologians quoted him repeatedly): it is not re-surrectio unless the same human being rises again.58 But what does it mean for a person to be "the same"? In the twelfth century, some felt that only the continuation of exactly the same matter qualified as sameness.59 Indeed some thinkers held that nutrition and growth were in a natural sense impossible because food could never change substance and become flesh. Since only substances exist, matter does not exist apart from form: prime matter is potency. When the human being dies, therefore, one cannot say that its body or its matter waits to be reassembled, for its body or matter does not exist at all. When the human being is resurrected, the body that is matter to its form (which is also its form of bodiliness because it is its only form) will by definition be its body. The cadaver that exists after we die, like the body that exists before, is second matter-formed matter but the cadaver is informed not by the form of the soul but by the form of the corpse. Thus, says Durandus, we may not say that God can make the body of Peter out of the body of Paul, because this is nonsense; if it is the body of Paul it is the body of Paul.64 But God can make the body of Peter out of dust that was once the body of Paul.65 And he need take no more or less dust than necessary to make a perfect human body. This theory could have swept away, as sheer foolishness, the questions of fingernails, foreskins, and aborted fetuses over which theo- There appears to have been concern generally in the 1270s that the teachings of Aristotle as interpreted by the Arab commentators might lead not only to denial of the immortality of the soul but also to denial of the resurrection of the body. Proposition 13 condemned in 1270 stated that "God cannot give immortality or incorruptibility to a corruptible or mortal thing."70 Propositions condemned in 1277 included not only the idea that the same body, numerically speaking, does not return7' but also other positions in which the issue of bodily identity is implicated: for example, "that God cannot give perpetuity to a mutable and corruptible thing," "that man, through the process of nutrition, can become another numerically and individually," "that one should not take care for the burying of the dead," and "that death is the end of all terrors [i.e., that there is no eternal punishment of the damned.]"72 Moreover, certain consequences of the new identity theory and of the connected theory of the unicity of form were also condemned. Controversy errupted in the 1270s over the implication that, if the cadaver is not the body, then Christ's body did not lie in the tomb for the three days between crucifixion and resurrection. Not all the events in the course of the debate are clear; but the record shows that the argument that a dead body is just a body equivocally (i.e., that the word "body" in the two phrases "dead body" and "living body" is merely a homonym) was condemned at Oxford in 1277. The doctrine of the unicity of form was also condemned in England in Since the early days of the twelfth century, schoolmen had seen that the status of Christ's body in the tomb had implications for the cult of the dead. Sentence collections tended to insert entries on prayers for the departed among quaestiones concerning Christ's body in the triduum, the nature of resurrected bodies generally, or the problem of how food was assimilated in the Garden of Eden.75 In the later thirteenth century, some charged explicitly that the notion of the equivocality of body threatened the cult of saints. In his treatise on the unicity of form, John of Paris defended himself against critics who maintained that the doctrine removed all justification for relic veneration. In his reply John not only maintained, as theologians had since Augustine, that relics were to be honored because they bring before our memories the life and suffering of the saints. He also held-in what almost amounts to a concession to material continuitythat the "first matter" (which does not quite mean mere potency) in relic and living saint is the same and is glorified in the body.76 We find a similar inconsistency in Aquinas himself when we look at Summa theologiae 3a, q. 25, art. 6: "Should we worship the relics of the saints?" Beginning with a quotation from Augustine to the effect that bodies are dearly loved garments, temples of the Holy Spirit, aids to memory, and tools for the working of miracles, Aquinas points out that "a dead body is not of the same species as a living body." It is therefore to be worshiped only for the sake of the soul that was once united to it. But then Aquinas, contradicting at least the pure formulation of his own identity theory, concludes: "The dead body of a saint is not identical to that which the saint held during life, on account of its difference of form-viz, the soul; but it is the same by identity of matter, which is destined to be reunited to its form."77 Not merely a mnemonic device, the body in the tomb is the body that will be joined to the saint in heaven.
Thus in the late thirteenth century, when the new categories of Aristotelian hylomorphism seemed to make material continuity irrelevant, theorists nonetheless discussed survival and resurrection as if identity of matter-or, to put it another way, univocality of "body"-were necessary. The texts I have just cited suggest that the adherence of theologians to material continuity was owing in part to pious practice. Intellectuals were aware that relic cult implied material continuity; the ordinary folk for whom they (or their pupils) crafted sermons behaved as if the bodies were the saints. And medieval intellectuals apparently preferred philosophical inconsistency to scandalizing the faithful.
Moreover, intellectuals sometimes even promoted veneration of holy bodies. Nor did they see such veneration merely as an aid to memory: it was veneration of the saints themselves. Preaching in the mid-twelfth century, Peter the Venerable, for example, was careful to emphasize that the souls of the saints are around the throne of heaven while their bodies are in churches for reverencing by the faithful; the saints are divided by death into two parts. But Peter nonetheless also spoke as if pieces of dead holy people are already touched by the glory they will attain at the end of time. relic cult were sometimes the explicit context for theological debate; theological distinctions sometimes informed sermons composed for church dedications or saints' days. I want to argue, however, that the connection between the outre examples of scholastic debate and the concerns of the pious existed at a deeper level as well-a level contemporaries did not see. The assumption that material continuity is crucial to identity is an assumption that runs throughout medieval culture; therefore, the theme of part and whole also runs deep. When we look at the way in which ordinary thirteenth-century people behaved, we find there too a concern with material continuity and thus with the corruption and reintegration of bodies.
The assumption that the material body we occupy in this life is integral to person and that the event we call death is not a radical break was reflected in legend, folktale, and even "science." Many stories that circulated in the later Middle Ages implied that the body was in some sense alive after death. Moralists told of temporary resurrections; hagiographers described dead saints who sat up momentarily to revere the crucifix or eucharistic host; medical writers spoke of cadavers that continued to move or grow while on the embalming table or in the tomb; folk wisdom held that corpses would bleed to accuse their murderers.80 Down into the seventeenth century, learned treatises were written by doctors on the life of the body after deatha phenomenon which seemed proved to some by such facts as the growth of fingernails and hair observed in corpses.81 The claim that all or part of a saint remained incorrupt after burial was an important miracle for proving sanctity, particularly the sanctity of women.82 Although the development of the doctrine of purgatory and increased discussion of the nature of the soul's condition between death and Last Judgment forced theologians to make it clear that the body is restored and glorified only at the end of time, preachers and teachers sometimes suggested that the ability of the martyrs to withstand pain or corruption was owing to an assimilation of their bodies on earth to . Gervase admitted that divine power could gather scattered parts but insisted that it was better to bury bodies intact so they were ready for the sound of the trumpet.86 Roger Bacon composed several works on how to postpone the "accidents" of old age and geared such precautions toward the resurrection: because Christ had promised bodily integrity to all at the Last Judgment persons here below should prepare themselves for it by striving for moral and physical intactness.87 Saints, who frequently effected miracles of healing or of temporary resurrection, sometimes simply reassembled cadavers without bothering to reanimate them. In an Old French life of Saint Barbara, for example, a decapitated head asks a priest for communion and is reunited with its body (although both parts remain lifeless) through the power of the saint;88 the popular story of a leg transplant performed by the physician saints Cosmas and Damian changes in its late medieval retelling to emphasize not only the grafting of a black leg onto a sick white man but also the attaching of the gangrenous white leg onto the corpse of the Moor from whom the original graft was taken.89 Such tales surely suggest that the intact condition of the body, even after death, had deep significance.
Despite such worries about fragmentation, however, division of the body was widely and enthusiastically practiced in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The culture of ancient Rome had possessed strong taboos against moving or dividing corpses-taboos which were overcome in the Christian cult of relics only over the course of hundreds of years.90 But by 1300 the practice was widespread of dividing not only the bodies of the saints to provide relics but also the bodies of the nobility to enable them to be buried in several places near several saints.9' As is well known, the years around 1300 saw the first cases of dissection carried out in medical schools.92 The same period witnessed the revival of torture as a judicial practice and a significant increase in the use of mutilation and dismemberment to punish capital crimes.93
Much research is still needed on these developments. But what is important for our purposes here is the amount of anxiety and controversy with which they were fraught. The papacy, as Elizabeth Brown has reminded us in a recent article, condemned the division of bodies by the nobility;94 and the various positions taken in the debate that surrounded the issuing of the papal bull were all based on the assumption that continuity of matter is necessary for continuity of person. The first medical dissections were touched, as Marie-Christine Pouchelle has brilliantly demonstrated, by an extraordinary sense of the mystery of the closed body, particularly the female body, and of the audacity required to open it.95 So highly charged was bodily partition that torturers were forbidden to effect it. Chronicle accounts of the use of dismemberment in capital cases make it clear both that it was reserved for only the most repulsive crimes and that the populace was expected to be able to read the nature of the offense from the precise way in which the criminal's body was cut apart and the pieces displayed. The fact that the earth is reported to refuse the normal process of decay to the extraordinarily evil suggests that there is in this culture an accepting, perhaps even a valuing, of natural decay. Such normal, organic corruption is good because it is a prelude to fertility; hence the analogy drawn in patristic writing between the naturally germinating seed and the resurrected bodies of the martyrs, "seeds of the church." Thus there seems to be a contrast between good corruption (decay) and bad corruption early thirteenth century, contains a number of stories of relics resisting division.98 Robert Grosseteste may have forbidden division of his corpse on his deathbed." The holy woman Mary of Oignies, who in a sense fragmented herself while alive by pulling out a large hunk of her hair to use as a device to cure the sick, castigated the prior of Oignies for "cruelly" extracting the teeth of a holy cadaver. After her own death Mary supposedly clenched her teeth when the same prior tried to extract them as relics; when he humbly asked her pardon, however, she shook out a few teeth from her jaw for his use.100
Thus the years around 1300 saw a new enthusiasm about dividing bodies for purposes of science, politics, and piety. Because the person was in some sense his body, the multiplication of holy or criminal body parts seemed pregnant with possibility. The heart of a king or the finger of a virgin made the earth where he or she was buried fertile with saintly or royal power. The greater the number of parts and places in which noble or holy figures resided after death, the greater the number of prayers they received or evoked and the more farflung their presence. The evil too were present wherever their bloody fragments were exhibited. In the severed quarters of a traitor displayed on castle walls, the person who broke the integrity of community was himself presented broken. Yet the cultural assumption that material continuity is crucial to person made such fragmentation horrifying as well. Popes therefore opposed cremation and dissection; physicians tried to preserve corpses forever from putrefaction. Indeed it seems to me that the increasing claims that holy bodies do not decay and especially that parts of holy bodies are incorrupt or intact represent a widespread concern to cross or deny the part/whole boundary by asserting the part to be the whole. The emphasis on body parts as "whole," on mutilated flesh as "intact," is after all an odd use of language; yet we find it over and over again in the period's most popular genre: hagiography.'01 (fragmentation), good wholeness (the incorruptibility of saints) and bad wholeness (the incorruption of sinners); see also Camporesi (n. 18 above). 101 The insistence that a relic is the saint or that the heart or liver of a king buried among his people is their sovereign seems parallel to modern statements that a donor lives on in a transplanted organ. Such use of synecdoche is clearly more than a linguistic matter.
As many recent scholars have pointed out, both the vernacular saints' tales of the high Middle Ages, which contain significant folkloric elements, and the new collections of legends made for the use of mendicant preachers agree in their archaizing tendency. Looking to distant events in Christian history and choosing heroines or heroes singularly unsuitable for pious imitation, hagiographers filled their pages with stories of martyrdom and mutilation.102 James of Voragine's Golden Legend, at least as popular in the later Middle Ages as the Bible itself,'03 can serve as my final example of the medieval capacity simultaneously to abhor, deny, and delight in bodily partition.
Recent studies of James have underlined the brutality of his accounts and his obsession with martyrdom, especially with torture and bodily division. 104 Of the 153 chapters of the Golden Legend devoted to saints' days, at least seventy-five have dismemberment as a central motif.'05 Nonetheless, the point of such tales is not the presence but the absence of suffering; there are only one or two references in all James's accounts of the early martyrs to the fact that mutilation might be uncomfortable.'06 So extravagant, indeed, is the denial of fragmentation, that, as several modern students of hagiography have pointed out, it is hard to say why James finally allows one among a series of lengthy tortures to dispatch his hero or heroine; in any case the actual death is often singularly anticlimactic.'07 What is underlined repeatedly is the reassembling of the fragmented body for burial or the victory of intactness over division. For example, the story of Beheaded and mutilated saints are "whole" and "unharmed." Severed toes are the seeds from which glorified bodies will spring. God's promise is that division shall finally be overcome, that ultimately there is no scattering."3 As one of the more conservative theologians might have said: material continuity is identity; body is univocal; the whole will rise, and every part is in a sense the whole.
CONCLUSION
My discussion has ranged far afield from the scholastic debates with which it began. But I doubt whether, for all its range, it has succeeded in quelling all the doubts and disagreeable sensations such material usually arouses in a modern audience. Some of the philosophical details may still seem far from clear. The theological details and hagiographical stories may remain distasteful. Even the historical conclusions may have no little capacity to shock, in view of the cliches about the spiritualism and dualism of the Middle Ages purveyed in college textbooks. Nonetheless, I hope I have compelled even outraged readers to recognize that the oddest medieval concerns are no less bizarre than modern ones. Moreover, the opinions of twelfth-and thirteenth-century schoolmen and of late twentiethcentury philosophers and medical sociologists have more in common than simply their respective oddity. In their debates about fetuses and fingernails as in their popular preaching and legends, medieval people expressed the understanding that body is essential to person and material continuity to body. A significant group among modern intellectuals does not disagree. It is clear both that questions of survival and identity are not, even today, solved, and that they can be solved only through the sort of specific body puzzles medieval theologians delighted to raise. This article may do no more than cause shocked readers to wonder who on earth would result if Caroline Bynum's brain were translated into the body of Lawrence Stone. But I hope that some will take it more seriously. In a world where we are faced with decisions about heart (and possibly even brain) transplants, about the uses of artificial intelligence, about the care of Alzheimer's patients and severely birthdamaged infants, we are forced to confront as never before the question, Am I my body? Issues of part and whole, of life prolongation and putrefaction, scream out at us from the headlines of the National Enquirer as we stand in supermarket check-out lines. We are no closer to definitive answers than were the medieval theologians who considered the resurrection of umbilical cords and fingernails. But, like them, we seem unwilling to jettison the conviction that material continuity is necessary for personal survival. Perhaps then, perusal of the New York Review of Books, the New York Times science page, or the National Enquirer-or an evening with "Star Trek" or "Max Headroom" or even "General Hospital"-suggests that we should feel greater respect than we have hitherto evidenced for the sophistication of medieval theologians.
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